Presentations

Selected presentations

‘Error theory, self-defeat, and skepticisms’
- Mar 2020. Cyprus Metaethics Workshop
‘Is the Internet safe? Personalization and the threat of epistemological skepticism’
- Jun 2019. Second Annual Social Epistemology Network Event (SENE2), Songdo, South Korea
‘Doxastic partiality as a manifestation (and not a requirement) of friendship’
- Jun 2019. CPA congress, UBC, Vancouver, BC
- Mar 2019. CRÉ/Parr Center for Ethics joint conference, UNC Chapel Hill, NC
- Mar 2019. Recherches récentes en philosophie analytique, Université de Montréal
‘Agency, normativity, and epistemology’/‘Varieties of epistemic constitutivism’
- Feb 2019. American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division Meeting, Denver, CO
- Feb 2019. Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité. Montréal, QC
‘Internet et éthique de la croyance : les dangers épistémiques de la personnalisation’
- Nov 2018. Les midis de l’éthique, Centre de recherche en éthique, Université de Montréal
‘Is the Internet safe? Personalization and the threat of epistemological skepticism’
- Jun 2018. Applied epistemology retreat, Prindle Institute for Ethics, DePauw University, IN
- Jun 2018. ‘Fake Knowledge’ Conference, University of Cologne, Germany
- Jun 2018. Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, Université du Québec à Montréal
- May 2018. Joint ALFAn-PHILOGICA Conference, Villa de Leyva, Colombia
‘Epistemic normativity for naturalists’
- Jun 2018. The Future of Normativity, University of Kent, UK
‘Is epistemic normativity value-based?’ / ‘The value-based theory of reasons and epistemic normativity’
- May 2017. Annual Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Ryerson University
- Jul 2016. Understanding Value V, University of Sheffield
‘Constructivisme métaéthique et normativité’
- Feb 2017. 5èmes Journées de métaéthique, Lausanne University, Switzerland
‘Epistemic norms, normativity, and epistemology’
- Nov 2015. Leuven Epistemology Conference: Epistemic Norms, KU Leuven
‘Why epistemic normativity won't come from what is constitutive of belief’
- May 2015. 12th London-Berkeley Philosophy Conference, UC Berkeley
- May 2015. 5th Edinburgh Graduate Epistemology Conference.
  - Respondent: Elizabeth Fricker
- Feb 2015. London Spring Graduate Conference in Philosophy
‘Why avoid error? On the alleged categoricity of epistemic norms’
- May 2015. 4th Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference
  - Respondent: Anandi Hattiangadi
‘Les normes épistémiques prouvent-elles le réalisme moral?’
- Jun 2015. Triennial SOPHA Congress, UdeM/UQÀM
- May 2015. 4èmes Journées de métaéthique, Université de Rennes 1
‘Epistemic instrumentalism and the authority of epistemic norms’
- Jul 2014. European Epistemology Network Meeting, Madrid
- Jun 2014. 4th Edinburgh Graduate Epistemology Conference.
  - Respondent: Matthew McGrath
- Jun 2014. Kracow Workshops in Analytic Philosophy
‘Comment éviter la théorie de l’erreur épistémique?’
- Mar 2014. Colloque jeunes chercheurs (SOPHA), Ovronnaz, Switzerland
‘Why be an epistemic expressivist?’ / ‘A challenge to epistemic non-cognitivism’
- Apr 2014. 5th Northwestern-Notre-Dame Epistemology Graduate Conference, Northwestern
- Sep 2013. Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA), Salzburg University
‘Morality, reasons for belief, and the metaethics of belief’
- May 2013. HU Berlin–KCL Graduate Philosophy Workshop, King’s College London
‘Epistemic blame and the challenge of doxastic involuntarism’
- Apr 2012. 12th Columbia-NYU Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Columbia University
‘Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy’
- Nov 2011. Florida Philosophical Association Annual Conference, Nova Southeastern University

Comments

Anne Baril ‘Is knowledge a basic good?’
- May 2019. Happiness, Wellbeing, and the Good Life, Montréal, Canada
Daniel Singer ‘There are permissible epistemic trade-offs’
- Mar 2018. Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop
Ralph Wedgwood ‘Against evidence’
- May 2017. St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR)
Michael Ridge ‘Reliability without relativism: How quasi-realists can have it both ways’
- Jun 2015. Southampton University Workshop on Epistemic and Practical Normativity